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I. INTRODUCTION
Nations rely on taxes to fund their activities and services. Because
each nation’s tax revenue is predominantly generated from domestic
sources, the right to tax is clearly of domestic origin. However, the
current state of trade relations involves multinational and foreign
corporations, as well as aspects of international law. As a result, two
critical questions are which of the parties in an international transaction
should be taxed, and of course, how should they be taxed?
One of the main purposes of the international tax field is to allow
and incentivize individuals and corporations to conduct business with
other countries. These cross-border transactions involve more than one
country and therefore, more than one tax regime. To avoid situations of
double taxation and even those of non-taxation, nations develop,
negotiate, and ultimately sign tax treaties. Once this process is
concluded, the two signatory nations agree on how to allocate taxes for
“different types of income.” 1
There are two basic and fundamental international tax bases: the
territorial (source) base, which capital exporter nations negotiate for in
treaties, and the resident base, negotiated for by capital importers. A
nation first needs to understand its best tax policy to obtain and optimize
a treaty. Second, it must understand how to implement this policy. To do
so, those drafting this policy must know the other nation’s needs and be
familiar with every tax treaty model and current tax treaties. This paper
will focus mostly on the United States’ tax treaties, and the evolution
that the United States has experienced while transforming from a capital
exporter to a country that imports as much as it exports. This will then
be compared to an analysis of China’s tax policy as well as the tax
policies of a few Latin American countries to determine whether there is
a need for change in the United States.

* Assistant Professor of Tax and the Frank & Karen Steininger Faculty Fellow, George W. Daverio
School of Accountancy, College of Business, The University of Akron. I would like to thank
Professor Yariv Brauner, Vered Kuperberg, and Danielle Shaffer for their insightful comments and
to Danielle Hickman and Thomas Winkhart for their outstanding research assistance. Any mistakes
and inaccuracies are mine.
1. See H.L. Goldberg, Conventions for the Elimination of International Double Taxation:
Toward a developing Country Model, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 833 (1983); Tsilly Dagan, The
Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF TAX TREATIES
From the year 1919 through 1935, as a result of significant
increases in the number of international transactions, organizations such
as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the League of
Nations appointed groups to study, analyze, and fight the issues of
double taxation and tax evasion. 2 The workings of such organizations
led to the development of a system of credits, which established how to
assign taxing jurisdictions on the basis of “economic allegiance.”3 In
1928, three model conventions were released (1928 Model Conventions)
which later became the standard for treaty discussions and even the basis
for the evolution of many initial U.S. tax treaties. 4
Less than twenty-five years later, the 1943 Mexico Model Tax
Treaty replaced the 1928 Model Conventions at the 1940 Fiscal
Committee Conference. This new model was intended to promote the
use of tax treaties between developing and developed countries. This
model was consistent with the general principle of taxing income at its
source. 5 However, the new treaty policy was widely unaccepted by
developed countries, so, in response, the 1946 London Model
Convention was drafted. 6 The amended model, created by European
members, attempted to encourage investments in developing countries,
specifically in Latin America.7 The main changes were as follows: (1)
the taxing rights over interests, dividends, annuities, and royalties were
given to the country of residence; 8 and (2) the nonresident entity’s
business profits were subjected to source-based taxation only if it had a
permanent establishment in that source country. 9
In 1956, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
2. Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and
Enterprises Abroad: Part I, 2 INT’L TAX LAW 692, 698 (1968); see U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc.
Affairs, U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries at
xv, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL].
3. BRUINS ET AL., REPORT ON DOUBLE TAXATION SUBMITTED TO THE FINANCIAL
COMMITTEE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1923), http://adc.library.usyd.edu.au/view?docId=split/law/xmlmain-texts/brulegi-source-bibl-1.xml;chunk.id=item-1;toc.depth=1;toc.id=item1;database=;collection=;brand=default.
4. See H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 365 (1981).
5. Carroll, supra note 2, at 708.
6. Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions for the Prevention of
Double Taxation of Income and Property, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.1946.II.A (1946)
[hereinafter London–Mexico Model Tax Convention].
7. U.N. MODEL, supra note 2, at xii.
8. London–Mexico Model Tax Convention, supra note 6, at 63-67.
9. Id. at 61.
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(OEEC), which was replaced by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 10 in 1961, began to form its own
committees in order find a way to deal with the issue of double taxation.
The 1977 Model Convention, the OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and Capital (OECD Model), built upon the developments made
by the ICC and League of Nations, quickly emerged as the benchmark
for tax treaties all over the world. 11
In 1980, the first U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries (U.N. Model) was released. 12
Although based largely on the 1977 OECD Model, the U.N. Model,
which was quickly embraced by developing countries, granted more
taxation rights to the source state, or capital importing country, than the
OECD Model.
The OECD published updates in 1992, 1994, 1995, and 1997 to its
treaty model. In 2001, a new U.N. Model was published to account for
the growth of the “globalization of trade and investment” since 1980. 13
The OECD again published updates in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010.
From an international point of view, these two models are the primary
standard for tax treaties. However, some countries, the United States
being the most notable, have their own models which they aspire to
utilize.
A.

Historical Development of the U.S. Model (1963 through 1976)

Since the 1930s, when the United States entered its first
comprehensive tax treaty, 14 all U.S. tax treaties were based upon the
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (U.S. Model), 15 which the Treasury
10. The legal entity of the OEEC was replaced and continued by the OECD, which came into
being on September 30, 1961; see HISTORY OF THE OECD, OECD (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/general/historyoftheoecd.htm.
11. Bart Kosters, The United Nations Model Tax Convention and Its Recent Development, 4
ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULL. (2004).
12. Michael Lennard, The Purpose and Current Status of the United Nations Tax Work, 14
ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULL. 24, 25 (2008).
13. U.N. MODEL, supra note 2, at xii.
14. The U.S. entered its first comprehensive tax treaty with France in 1932. The treaty did
not come into effect until 1935; see E. M. McCaffery, The Franco-American Convention Relative to
Double Taxation, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 382 (1936).
15. I.R.S., U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE U.S. MODEL
INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF 2006, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/the-us-model-income-tax-convention-and-model-technical-explanation [hereinafter U.S. MODEL]; see
Wm. L. Burke, Report on Proposed United States Model Income Tax Treaty, 23 HARV. INT’L L. J.
219, 220 (1983); see also Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX
& BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (1986); see also H. David Rosenbloom, Current Developments in Regard to Tax
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developed throughout the course of treaty negotiations with various
states. Once the OECD published its first version of the Treaty Model in
1963, many countries began to rely on the OECD Model while
negotiating tax treaties. Gradually, the U.S. Treasury experienced an
increase in resistance toward the model it had been using, which had not
yet been published or otherwise officially acknowledged. The structure,
terminology, and content of this unofficial model were unfamiliar to
most foreign countries, as it varied greatly from the OECD Model.16
Rather than explaining the divergent U.S. terminology during
negotiations with each individual treaty partner, the Treasury gradually
began to conform to the customs set forth by the OECD Model. This
trend became apparent in the early 1960s 17 and peaked in 1975 with the
conclusion of the U.S.–U.K. tax treaty.
In spite of this coalescence between models, the OECD Model did
not replace the unofficial U.S. Model. Instead, the Treasury decided to
publish its own model and created the official U.S. Model, the first
official version of which was released on May 18, 1976. 18 Although
never officially stated, it appears the main reason that the U.S. Treasury
adhered to the OECD Model was due to the understanding that the
United States was no longer in a position to keep expanding its tax treaty
network without adopting the dominant structure and terminology that
most countries followed during negotiations. 19 Also, because the United
States wanted to emphasize residence state taxation in its model,
adopting the OECD Model simplified this goal because the OECD

Treaties, 40 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 31, 31-56 (1982).
16. Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 31-62.
17. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.–L.U., art. V, Apr.
3, 1996, 2148 UNTS 81 [hereinafter U.S.–Luxembourg Treaty] (following the Permanent
Establishment definition of the OECD Model and adopts certain concepts regarding taxation of
permanent establishment). See also Convention between the Government of The United States of
America and the Government of the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S–F.R., Nov. 27,
1956, 7 UST 3405 [hereinafter U.S.–France Treaty]; the Convention between The United States of
America and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–B.E., art. V, July 9, 1970, 3 UST 5245
[hereinafter U.S.–Belgium Treaty].
18. Administrative Law, 41 Fed. Reg. 20, 427 (1976) (announcement of U.S. Model). See
also Burke, supra note 15, at 224.
19. Rosenbloom, supra note 15. See also Income Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 71 (1980)
[hereinafter Income Tax Treaties] (Statement of H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Counsel,
Department of the Treasury).
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Model emphasized the same tax policy. Since then, both the OECD and
United States have published new versions of their models.
The drafting and publishing process of the U.S. Model serves two
purposes. First, the model is intended to offer a “uniform starting point”
for any U.S. treaty negotiations.20 In typical treaty negotiations, before
the actual discussions get underway, the United States forwards the U.S.
Model to the potential treaty partner, which serves as a draft for the “first
round” of negotiations. 21 Based upon this first draft, specific problem
areas are then addressed and amended. Past experiences have shown that
the Treasury is willing to alter provisions of the U.S. Model, especially
while negotiating with developing countries. 22
The second purpose of the U.S. Model is to promote extensive
harmonization of U.S. treaties with the OECD Model. 23 In drafting the
official U.S. Model (rather than the unofficial model released prior), the
Treasury sought to minimize the differences between the U.S. Model
and OECD Model that had little or no substantive importance. 24
Therefore, the topics in the U.S. Model that diverge from the OECD
Model highlight important aspects of U.S. tax treaty policy. It should be
noted that both purposes have been criticized. 25 As for the first, some
researchers believe that viewing the U.S. Model as the “first offer” for
every tax treaty negotiation places unnecessary limitations on the
flexibility of tax treaty negotiations and drafting procedures. These
researchers claim that if the U.S. Model constitutes a “first offer”—a
benchmark for a treaty negotiations process—then the United States
delegation could be forced to accept certain provisions that are
inappropriate in the context of the negotiations with a particular country.
Of course, this must have been taken into consideration at some point
during the U.S. Model drafting process; thus, this model does not
provide a neutral, accurate portrait of U.S. tax treaty policy, but rather
the most favorable starting point for U.S. tax treaty negotiations.
It has been suggested, both here and by other commentators, that
20. See Vogel, supra note 15, at 13; International Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 115 (1979) [hereinafter International Tax Treaties]
(David C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policies, Responses to Additional
Questions for the Record) (“The U.S model income tax convention was developed to provide a
uniform starting point for U.S. income tax treaty negotiations and to conform U.S treaties as closely
as possible to the model income convention of the OECD.”). See also Income Tax Treaties, supra
note 19, at 70.
21. International Tax Treaties, supra note 20, at 103.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 105.
24. Income Tax Treaties, supra note 19, at 71.
25. Burke, supra note 15. See also Rosenbloom, supra note 15.
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the U.S. Model should be viewed as the ultimate goal that the United
States would like to reach in its tax treaty negotiations. According to this
view, in terms of the U.S. tax treaty policy, the U.S. Model should
signify an ideal treaty, as opposed to just the starting point for actual
treaty negotiations. 26 Critics of this suggestion say that it results in a lack
of flexibility during negotiations, as every change in the model will be
seen as taking a step back from an ideal tax treaty.
Also, drafting the U.S. Model to foster extensive conformity
between U.S. tax treaties and the OECD Model may have been criticized
because many of the provisions in the first OECD Model were drafted
prior to the year the United States joined and became a member of the
OECD. 27 Moreover, the United States did not always participate in
drafting the OECD Model. Therefore, the issue of whether the OECD
Model truly represents the U.S. tax treaty interests arises as,
traditionally, the U.S. had its own “peculiarities” in its tax treaty policy
and approach. 28
Nonetheless, the most important decision the Treasury made while
drafting the U.S. Model was whether the structure and the content of
their model should be altered to conform to that of the OECD Model, or
continue on the path of divergence. 29 This decision was necessary to
further expand the U.S. treaty network, largely due to the fact that all
other countries were relying on the OECD Model as their basic reference
document for drafting tax treaties. 30 As a result of the decision to
conform, the U.S. Model parallels the structure of the OECD Model, as
even the individual articles of the U.S. Model cover principally the same
issues as those in the OECD Model. To a significant extent, the models
also correspond in terms of content. In addition to adopting the structure
of the OECD Model, the U.S. Model also adopted the OECD
terminology and the formulations of many individual provisions.
However, since the U.S. tax treaty policy was not exactly the same as the
OECD tax treaty policy, a complete adoption of the OECD was not
possible.
Theoretically, these tax treaty models are meant to reflect each
specific country’s tax policy. However, as we often see in taxation and
other areas of life, a country’s tax policy may change frequently as a
matter of short-term political agendas and various other reasons. For
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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example, many expect that newly-elected President Trump’s
administration will have a completely different policy and approach
towards international trade and multinational corporations. Any type of
tax reform or change to the code may reflect a completely different
approach than President Trump’s predecessors. Therefore, these specific
models may not best reflect a country’s long-term tax policy.
This paper suggests that policy makers, specifically tax policy
makers, need to identify their country’s best tax policy that on its face
serves the country’s long-term interests, so that their proposed tax
treaties will not change as frequently and will be implemented in
practice, not just in theory. Once again, to identify the right tax policy,
we need to go back to the basics, which means identifying the purpose of
tax treaties.
B.

U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty Update (2016)

In May 2015, the United States Treasury Department released a
document containing proposed revisions to the U.S. Model. Many of
these revisions were recommended in order to help prevent the issue of
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) of multinational corporations.
As the international tax environment continues to evolve, individual tax
regimes also change and develop. This evolution of various tax regimes
could enhance BEPS within such countries, which is a significant
concern for the U.S. Treasury Department. Thus, to continuously oppose
instances of BEPS and set a benchmark for other treaty negotiations, the
Treasury issued proposed changes to ensure the United States would be
“able to maintain the balance of benefits negotiated under its treaty
network” as well as “deny treaty benefits to companies that change their
tax residence in an inversion transaction.” 31 It is important to note that
once finalized, the proposed changes must be implemented into existing
treaties before becoming effective due to the fact that the Model is not
self-executing. 32
The OECD has also been working to combat BEPS. and in October
31. Press Releases, Treasury Releases Select Draft Provisions for Next U.S. Model Income
Tax Treaty, United States Department of Treasury (May 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl10057.aspx.
32. US TREASURY PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION:
OVERVIEW,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
(May
21,
2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/insights/us-treasury-proposes-changes-usmodel-income-tax-convention.html; US PROPOSES MAJOR REVISIONS TO MODEL TAX TREATY TO
COUNTER
BASE
EROSION,
ERNST
&
YOUNG
(May
29,
2015),
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Alert—US-proposes-major-revisions-tomodel-tax-treaty-to-counter-base-erosion.
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of 2015 it released the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 2015 Final
Report (BEPS Report). 33 In fact, the release of the proposed changes for
the first set of U.S. Model revisions has been thought to be an attempt to
influence the BEPS Report 34 and keep the United States involved in such
international conversations. Both reports look to decrease the
occurrences of “stateless income” or double non-taxation in special tax
regimes. 35 A special tax regime, as defined by the Treasury, is aimed to
provide low tax rates on specific types of income in various countries,
especially mobile income that is easy to shift from one location to
another. Specifically, paragraph 1(l) of Article 3 was recommended to be
modified to address special tax regimes. 36
Another way the Treasury has looked to deter BEPS is by
eliminating treaty shopping by third-countries due to the presence of a
Permanent Establishment (PE) located outside the treaty country. This
objective would modify the current Article 1, paragraph 7. This
modification applies if the profits derived from the PE are subject to less
than sixty percent of tax than the applicable tax rate in the residence
state and the country where the PE is located that does not have a tax
treaty with the United States. In turn, this alteration would directly affect
the current “triangular provisions” of U.S. tax treaties and would not
allow for preferential rates (i.e., fifteen percent) for dividends, interest,
and royalties. 37
In certain instances, however, it may be appropriate for thirdcountries to receive some benefits, such as when the income from a PE
is included in the tax base of a residence state.38 To recognize the
33. BASE EROSION PROFIT SHIFTING 2015 FINAL REPORT, ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC
COOPERATION (October 5, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm.
34. BASE EROSION PROFIT SHIFTING 2015 FINAL REPORT, ACTION 5: COUNTERING
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (October 5, 2015); BASE EROSION PROFIT SHIFTING 2015 FINAL REPORT, ACTION 6:
PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS INAPPROPRIATELY, ORGANIZATION OF
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (October 5, 2015).
35. Id. See Michael H. Radolinski, U.S. Treasury Attempts to Influence OECD’s BEPS
Initiative via Proposed Changes to U.S. Model Treaty, OSLER (June 22, 2015),
https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2015/u-s-treasury-attempts-to-influence-oecd-sbeps-in; Treasury Releases Select Draft Provisions for Next U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra
note 31.
36. US TREASURY PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 32.
37. See TREASURY RELEASES DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE 2006 U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION,
DELOITTE
(July
10,
2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
TREASURY
Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-unitedstates-10-july-2015.pdf;
US
PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 32.
38. Id.
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relevance of subsidiary corporations involved with treaty nations, the
implementation of a “derivative benefits” rule has been proposed to
expand conceptual ownership in the case of “equivalent beneficiaries” 39
that meet a base erosion test. 40 This modification is one of the many
recommended changes to Article 22, the Limitation on Benefits (LOB),
of the current U.S. Model. Other variations include a restriction on
attribution of activities under the active trade or business (ATB) test and
a substantial nontax nexus for purposes of discretionary relief. 41
The Treasury also looked to decrease the benefits received through
corporate inversions. The revisions looked to employ a system that
implements withholding taxes on certain crucial payments 42 made by
“expatriated entities,” 43 affecting Articles 10, 11, 12, and 21 of the
current U.S. Model. There is a possibility that this revision could be
limited to payments made amongst related parties. 44
Along with the other proposed modifications, a new Article 28,
Subsequent Changes in Law, was considered for addition as well, which
would allow provisions of certain articles (specifically 10, 11, 12, and
21) to “cease to have effect” if the general tax rate of the contracting
state drops beneath fifteen percent. 45 This proposal also surfaced in the
BEPS Report, Article 6, in regards to treaty abuse.46 The Treasury was
also anticipated to include a new article in the finalized update to
“resolve disputes between tax authorities through mandatory binding
arbitration.” 47
39. “Defined as either (i) a resident of any state if entitled to benefits under a comprehensive
US tax treaty that would be no worse than those being claimed if that resident had received the
income directly, or (ii) a qualified resident of the taxpayer’s residence state;” US TREASURY
PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 32, at 3.
40. Press Releases, supra note 31; US Treasury proposes fundamental changes to US Model
Income Tax Convention, supra note 32, at 3. The base erosion test would require “each intermediate
owner between the tested company and the public company to be a resident of either state.” US
TREASURY PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (May 21, 2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/
insights/assets/pwc-us-treasury-proposes-changes-us-model-income-tax-convention.pdf.
41. TREASURY RELEASES DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE 2006 U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 37, at 7.
42. E.g., dividends and base-stripping payments such as interest and royalties. See id.
43. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2) (2005).
44. US TREASURY PROPOSES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO US MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 32, at 3.
45. Id. at 4.
46. KPMG REPORT – PROPOSED REVISIONS TO U.S. MODEL TREATY, KPMG LLP (June 10,
2015), http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/taxnewsflash/pages/20151/kpmg-report-proposed-revisions-to-us-model-treaty.aspx.
47. Treasury Releases Select Draft Provisions for Next U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra
note 31.
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After leaving the proposals open to recommendations and
comments from the public, the Treasury modified these revisions and
released the new U.S. Model on February 17, 2016. 48 The final version
does not “reduce withholding taxes on payments of highly mobile
income” with regard to special tax regimes, but it does take measures to
penalize companies that invert by disallowing a reduction in withholding
taxes on payments sourced to the United States. 49 Furthermore, an article
has been included which requires the partners of each respective treaty
to revise and amend the document as needed for changes in domestic
law that may affect treaty benefits. 50 Rules have also been added that
require mandatory arbitration in the case of “disputes between tax
authorities,” 51 and the LOB provision was revised, as expected. 52
Specifically, for the “active trade or business” test, the Treasury is open
to comments through April 18, 2016 with regards to the technical
explanation of this provision. 53 Remarkably, no changes were made to
the PE. Any changes were originally intended to be included in the PE,
as well as notably covered in the BEPS Report.
Concern has been raised that the updates will potentially cause an
inconsistent application of the rules presented and thus lead to
uncertainty for taxpayers. Consultants, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC), have recommended implementing changes through legislation as
opposed to using the U.S. Model. Historically, it has been noted that the
suggestion of increased withholding rates has caused more barriers to
trade than it has helped to combat harmful tax practices. 54

48. Press Releases, Treasury Announces Release of 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty,
United States Department of Treasury (February 17, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl0356.aspx.
49. Id.
50. Insights, New U.S. model income tax treaty (2016) is released, KPMG LLP (February 17,
2016),
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2016/02/tnf-us-model-income-tax-treaty2016.html.
51. Id.
52. Kevin Colan & Paul Seraganian, U.S. Treasury Releases New Model Tax Treaty, OSLER
(Februrary 22, 2016), https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2016/u-s-treasury-releasesnew-model-tax-treaty.
53. PREAMBLE TO 2016 U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (February 17, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/Preamble-US%20Model-2016.pdf.
COMMENT
LETTER
ON
UNITED
STATES
MODEL
TREATY,
54. PWC
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (September 29, 2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/
publications/insights/pwc-comment-letter-on-united-states-model-treaty.html.
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III. ANALYZING THE TAX TREATY MODELS
A.

Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Model, OECD Model, & U.N.
Model

It is no surprise that the U.N. Model and the U.S. Model are based
on the OECD Model, since the latter has been the foundation for tax
treaties since its implementation in 1977. As a result, the differences
between the models are not significant and the basic principles and
structures are almost identical.
The fact that all three models include the same format, syntax, and
concepts is one of the main reasons that tax treaties are a staple within
global commerce; it creates a “universal language” and bridges different
countries, allowing them to “interact” with one another and solve
problematic issues concerning business practices and taxation in a
relatively efficient way.
Nevertheless, there are differences between the models, arising
mostly from the differing policies each entity strives to implement. The
OECD Model acts under the general assumption that there is a rough
parity of trade and capital flows between countries, and gives relief for
double taxation by reducing the tax in the source country where the
income was produced. On the contrary, the U.N. Model takes into
account special circumstances of developing countries and promotes tax
sparing. Also, it is somewhat easier for foreigners to have a PE in the
source country. 55 The U.N. Model chooses to leave reductions of
withholding rates to bilateral negotiations, which usually leads to higher
withholding rates.
Although it is largely consistent with the OECD Model, there were
some issues upon which the U.S. Model could not compromise. These
issues are: 56
1. The “Saving Clause,” where the United States reserves the
right to tax U.S. citizens as if the tax treaty does not exist.
55. Within the tax treaty context, the concept of Permanent Establishment (PE) is of
extremely significant importance and is oftentimes crucial. PE has been used as an indication of the
substantial and long-term presence of a non-resident enterprise in the source state. Only if the
activities of a non-resident enterprise have reached the threshold of a PE in the source state can this
enterprise be regarded as a participant in the economy of the source state to an extent that the source
state can, and often will, claim taxation on business income of that non-resident enterprise. See G.S.
Turner, Permanent Establishments, and Interprovincial Income Allocation: Reflections on the
Advisory Report on Electronic Commerce, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING (1998).
56. Brauner Yariv, Why Does the United States Conclude Tax Treaties? And Why Does it not
Have a Tax Treaty With Brazil?, 26 REVISTA DIREITO TRIBUTARIO ATUAL 109 (2011) (in
Portuguese).
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2. Consistent refusal to allow effective management to
dominate the corporate residence rules.
3. Increased emphasis on reciprocity, particularly concerning
effective exchange of information.
4. Refusal to include “Tax Sparing” in its tax treaties.
5. Insistence on including a “Limitation on Benefits” clause as
a backstop to the regular residence rules.
A deeper analysis will show that the OECD Model actually, in time,
accepted most of these issues.
B.

The Objectives of Tax Treaties

The main objectives of tax treaties are reducing double taxation, 57
preventing excessive taxation, and helping minimize tax avoidance
through exchange of information. 58 However, oftentimes another reason
for signing a tax treaty is “tax sparing.” National tax systems often use
some type of tax or other fiscal incentives to “attract investments in
specific industries or geographical areas.” 59 Conversely, these incentives
may be minimized or even eradicated by the taxing jurisdiction in the
investor’s resident country. 60 The reason for this elimination is that a
reduction of source-country tax is simply compensated for by an
increase in the tax imposed by the country of residence because the
creditable foreign tax is diminished. As a result, the tax benefit that was
originally intended to encourage foreign investments ends up in the
country of residence of the foreign investors. Obviously, this is not the
outcome countries are seeking. To prevent this from happening in
developed countries, tax treaties with developing countries allow foreign
tax credits where the tax at the source country was reduced or even
eliminated, as if it was collected in full.

57. John Prebble, The General Principle, Effects and Structure of Tax Treaties, 10 ASIAN
PACIFIC TAX AND RES. CENTRE BULL. 555, 556 (1992); Rosenbloom, supra note 15; CHARLES H.
GUSTAFSON & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS, 19911993, 451 (COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, 1991); Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 4, at 365-66.
58. Treaties: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 11 (2004)
(statement of Barbara M. Angus, Treas. Int’l Tax Counsel) [hereinafter Angus Testimony]; see also
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 1-13 (THE
INSTITUTE 1992).
59. See OECD, Making Reforms Succeed: Moving Forward with the MENA Investment
Policy Agenda, 233 (OECD Publishing 2008).
60. Dagan, supra note 1, at 995.
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Structure of Tax Treaties

All treaty models follow the same basic blueprints. First, treaties
provide rules that detail situations in which a taxpayer would be a
resident of each contracting state under each state’s domestic law.
Second, a system is set up for default allocation rules, where either the
residence state or the source state is given the “primary right” to tax
income, and the other state either gives up its right to tax entirely or
preserves a “residual right” to tax. The right to tax income is determined
by its classification. 61 In general, tax treaties usually allocate more tax
jurisdiction to the residence state. On the other hand, when no tax treaty
exists, the source state generally has a primary right to tax, with the
residence state having a residual tax right and a “unilateral obligation to
relieve any resulting double taxation.” 62 With the implementation of a
treaty, both parties to the agreement are mutually obligated to counter
the issue of double taxation. At the same time, “excessive taxation” is
avoided by decreasing the amount of source withholdings to the other
parties’ residents. 63 The policy behind all of this is simple: to minimize
or even eliminate any tax issue that may discourage individuals or
corporations from engaging in cross-border transactions.
Each of the treaty models mentioned before, although written
following the same pattern, represents a different international tax
policy. This paper will discuss two main points for change that will
likely benefit current tax treaties. First, the traditional way of thinking is
no longer accurate within the current business environment, and the best
policy for a capital exporter or a capital importer country should be
followed. Second, in some cases, countries should adopt more than one
policy to serve their national interest, depending on specific economic
characteristics.
IV. RETHINKING BASIC FUNDAMENTALS IN TAX TREATIES
When dealing with tax treaties, it becomes apparent that there are
some terms that are inaccurate, obsolete, or misleading. As a result,
using and accepting these terms “as is” may dissuade tax policy makers
and scholars from using tax treaties in a more efficient manner.
Often, when tax scholars and practitioners talk about tax treaties,
they use the terms “developed countries” and “developing countries”
61. Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV.
65, 69-71 (2005).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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when attempting to pinpoint an economy or country’s preferred tax
treaty model. This paper suggests that these terms are not only biased,
but also not completely accurate in the contemporary business
environment.
One of the problems with the use of the terms “developed
countries” and “developing countries” is that they are vague and unclear.
For example, the OECD has claimed since its inception in the 1960s to
represent developed countries and accept only these countries as
members. If this claim is accurate, how can Greece, Turkey, and Mexico
be members of the OECD? If these countries are not developed
countries, based on what this term actually means, can they decide not to
use the OECD Model for their tax treaty negotiations because they are
not developed countries based on what developed definitionally means?
According to the United Nations, “[t]he designations of ‘developed
countries’ and ‘developing countries’ are intended for statistical
convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage
reached by a particular country or area in the development process.” 64
Moreover, the commonly accepted definition of a developed country
from the U.N. is that “a developed country is one that allows all its
citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment.” 65 This
definition is confusing at best and maintains its previous uncertainty.
Even if the correct definition is clear, the designation has nothing to do
with any country’s tax policy or economic needs.
This paper suggests using more specific, although still not
completely comprehensive, definitions such as “capital exporter” or
“capital importer” to describe countries. This definition is based upon
clean, hard data and cannot be based upon biased opinion or influenced
by subjective information and agendas. However, although these
definitions are better than the ones traditionally used, they are still not
completely accurate, as mentioned in the opening of this paragraph. In
some cases, these terms can still cause issues when properly describing
the situation and including all the necessary data and information.
The fact that some countries are not pure capital exporters or pure
64. See Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, World Population
NATIONS
(2015),
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/
2015,
UNITED
Files/World_Population_2015_Wallchart.pdf; Department of Economic and Social Affairs:
Population Division, World Population Policies, UNITED NATIONS (2013); Terms and Conditions,
NATIONS
POPULATION
FUND
(2008),
http://web.unfpa.org/public/cache/
UNITED
offonce/home/pid/3802.
65. Press Release, In Address to UNDP Resident Coordinators, Secretary-General Stresses
Need for “Experiment and Creativity” in Development Efforts, UN Press Release SG/SM/7316
DEV/2232 (Feb. 28, 2000).
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capital importers in the new business environment can cause even these
rephrased definitions to become inaccurate. Rather, in some types of
industries such as manufacturing, countries are capital importers and, in
others, they are capital exporters. By using this clear and significant
distinction obtained through essential analysis, it is apparent that
countries will have a completely different economic interest depending
on with which country they wish to negotiate and sign a tax treaty.
V. THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE U.S. TAX TREATY POLICY
A.

Changes in the U.S. Economy

Until the 1980s, most manufacturing was what is referred to today
as “traditional manufacturing,” which included mostly, but not solely,
tangible assets. Most manufacturing was done in the United States,
which made the country become one of the largest capital exporters in
the world. Therefore, its tax treaties were drafted in a way that notably
reflected this position and provided the maximum deduction given for a
Permanent Establishment situated in other countries. This ensured that
business enterprises and residents in the United States were able to
transfer profit from their Permanent Establishments back to the United
States. However, as globalization began taking hold of the business
world, technology became less expensive and more sophisticated, and
the United States began to import manufactured products for growing
consumption, which then created stronger demand for the
“manufacturing” of intangible assets.
As a result, the U.S. economy started to transform from a capital
exporting country to a country that imports as much as it exports. 66 The
U.S. Census Bureau website has data regarding the U.S. trade of goods
and services on a balance of payments basis dating back to the year
1960. During this time, although total trade was significantly under five
percent of the total GDP, the United States was exporting more than it
was importing. Today, the United States imports more than it exports
and trade is closer to twenty-five percent of its total GDP. 67 This
analysis and the attempt to label the type of economy (i.e., whether it is a
capital export or capital import economy), becomes increasingly more
66. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trends and Recent
Developments in Foreign Direct Investments (2004).
67. Mark Wieczorek, The US Trade Deficit, MARK T.A. WIECZOREK (2003),
http://www.marktaw.com/culture_and_media/TheUSTradeDeficit.html; U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND
SERVICES – BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS, THE UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (2015),
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf.
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complicated when capital import and export rates for individual
countries vary drastically.
For instance, although it may appear as though trading with China
and Mexico is comparable, a closer look into the import/export ratio
shows an important difference in both levels. The United States’ trade
with Mexico is forty-one percent exports. On the other hand, with China,
that amount is only fifteen percent. As a result, this difference must be
addressed in the formulation of each tax treaty. In order to incorporate
different formulations between different countries, it is important to
understand what the most appropriate policy that needs to be
implemented into each tax treaty based on the countries involved. 68
This data raises an important question: due to the changes in its
economic structure, what are the United States’ real economic interests
in tax treaties today?
B.

The U.S. Tax Treaty Policy
1. Analyzing the U.S. Tax Treaty Policy

In the 1960s, when the United States first became more engaged in
tax treaty agreements, its approach was fundamentally structured with a
strong preference to residence taxation, since it was one of the world’s
largest capital exporters. Unfortunately, this unchanged belief ignored
the fact that, during the 1980s, the United States became a net capital
importer; this should have created a strong reform in every U.S. tax
policy. Additionally, to add more complexity to their economic position,
the United States remained a large capital exporter economy. 69 This
unaltered tax policy was criticized by notable former officials and tax
scholars; for example, twenty years ago, Professor H. David
Rosenbloom called for a re-evaluation of the U.S. tax treaty policy,
which he found lacking at best. 70
The concept mentioned above found its place in tax treaties in the
pursuit of a maximum residence-based taxation while minimizing, if not
eliminating, withholding tax rates. Moreover, this approach does not fit
the U.S. historic view that each tax treaty was a separate, independent
agreement negotiated with the goal of maximizing benefits received by
the United States. It seems like U.S. officials were much more concerned
at that time about the evasion of U.S. tax collection from U.S. taxpayers,
68.
69.
70.
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rather than foreign residents. This concern is what led to a focus on
treaty shopping and exchange of information issues over the last fifty
years.
Rosenbloom and Stanley Langbein described four principal periods
of U.S. tax treaties. 71 The first period spanned the term of the general
U.S. tax treaty which covered items of investment income in the 1942
treaty with Canada. The second, spanning the term of the 1945 U.K.
treaty, distinguished between different categories of passive income 72
and led to the inauguration of a program that included a tax sparing
provision. 73 The third period consisted of renegotiations of earlier tax
treaties to include U.S. approaches such as the “general rule of taxation”
and source income. Finally, the last periods are those based on the U.S.
Model, since it was first published in 1976 and appears to generally
follow the OECD Model.
2. Evaluating the U.S. Tax Treaty Policy
Surprisingly, the U.S.–China tax treaty, which came into effect on
January 1, 1987, seems to be based on the U.N. Model more so than any
other tax treaty model. For example, Articles 3 (Definitions), 5
(Permanent Establishment), and 7 (Business Profits) are almost identical
to the U.N. Model version of that time.
As is consistent with the U.N. Model, Articles 9 (Dividends), 10
(Interest), and 11 (Royalty Income) in the U.S.–China tax treaty favor
allocation to the source nation as opposed to the resident nation.
However, the maximum rates for dividends in this treaty follows the lead
of the U.S. Model, which has a ceiling of five percent on direct
dividends and fifteen percent on portfolio dividends. However, the U.N.
Model instead allows for negotiation when it comes to the maximum
rates. A much broader definition of “royalties” is also included, which is
not seen in either the U.S. or U.N. Models. 74
71. Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 4, at 374.
72. Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 4158 [hereinafter U.S.–U.K.
Treaty].
73. The first tax treaty to introduce such provision was the tax treaty with Pakistan. See A
Convention between the United States of America and Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–Pak., July 1,
1957, 10 U.S.T. 984 [hereinafter U.S.–Pakistan Treaty].
74. Agreement between the Government of The United States of America and the
Government of The People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 11, U.S.–P.R.C., Apr. 30, 1984,
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By allowing for a broader source-based taxation program, China
will receive more of a benefit than if it were to follow the U.S. Model, or
even the generally favorable source-based U.N. Model. Thus, the U.S.–
China tax treaty is notoriously generous towards China. However, China
did not appear to make any unusual negotiations with the United States.
For example, many of the provisions, such as the ten percent rate limit
on withholding at the source of passive investment income such as
dividends, interest, and royalties, resemble very similar provisions made
in other treaties like the U.S.–Jamaica tax treaty. 75 In addition, this
amount is the exact same as the provision which China currently has in
their treaty with Japan. 76
There was one area in which the United States and China had
strongly opposing views: the tax sparing provision. While China
persisted in including a tax sparing credit, 77 the United States settled the
issue by granting China the unique and highly desirable “most favored
nation” (MFN) status with regard to any future U.S. tax sparing policy
changes. 78
It is clear that political concerns were a driving force behind the
negotiations of this treaty for several reasons. It was first signed by a
U.S. president. 79 It was highly favorable toward taxation at source. And
it included many other provisions that favored China. However, there is
a known concern in the U.S. that if China pushes the limits in
negotiations and attempts to “stack the deck,” other countries will follow
China’s lead when drafting tax treaties.80 Although negotiations are vital
35 U.S.T. 3819 [hereinafter U.S.–China Treaty]; U.N. MODEL, supra note 2, at art. 12; U.S. MODEL,
supra note 15. In the U.S.–China Treaty, Article 11 specifically includes income derived from the
use of films, tapes, and technical know-how. The U.S. Model’s Article 12 excludes films and tapes
specifically and omits technical know-how, and the U.N. Model’s Article 12 includes films and
tapes, but not technical know-how.
75. The Convention between the Government of The United States of America and the
Government of Jamaica for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.–Jam., art. 10 – 12, May 21, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2865
[hereinafter U.S.–Jamaica Treaty].
76. People’s Republic of China-Japan: Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income art. 10-12, 23 I.L.M. 120 (1984)
[hereinafter China–Japan Treaty].
77. See Paul D. Reese, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The
China Example, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 369, 387 (1987).
78. See Reese, supra note 77; U.S.–China Treaty, supra note 106 at 1445.
79. Agreement with China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: Hearing on Treaty Doc.
98-30 before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (July 30, 1985)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Ron Pearlman, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S.
Department of the Treasury). See also Daily Tax Rep., Tax Treaties: Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Clears Way for Ratification of U.S.-China Agreement, BNA (1986).
80. Reese, supra note 77, at 391.
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to ensure continuous positive relations between the U.S. and China, it
may be necessary for the United States to implement procedures in order
to prevent unfavorable treaty provisions in the future.
One suggestion for improvement is to have the United States create
stock treaty models to reflect the various types of potential countries and
economies with which the U.S. will negotiate. For example, one of the
models could detail negotiations with a third-world country.
Additionally, in negotiations, nations should be informed that, in order
to conclude a treaty with the United States, any deviation made from the
U.S. standard must be countered with concessions of their own.
This paper suggests that the United States delegation team’s
flexibility should be eliminated. In addition, a higher and more finely
tuned adherence to the new proposed treaty model will assist the tax
treaty ratification process. From the United States’ perspective, cases
such as the one ruled upon by the Beijing High Court in 2002 81 should
not have occurred. The United States unnecessarily paid over $1.5
million in taxes due to the flexibility regarding the definitions of
royalties. But for the allowed flexibility regarding royalties, the passive
royalty income paid by China’s CCTV to a U.S. satellite company
would have otherwise been classified as business income and thus not
taxable in China. Instead, it was subject to seven percent withholding by
CCTV. 82
VI. CHINA’S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION—A SHIFT IN TAX TREATY POLICY
A.

China—General Introduction

Shortly after its founding in 1949, People’s Republic of China
founded a formal tax system in 1950. Since then, China has been able to
watch and learn from some of the best practices amidst the development
of the business world. Thus, China was able to revolutionize its
economy and transform into the international powerhouse that it is
today. 83
In general, China’s taxes are classified into four broad categories:
(1) Tax on Industry and Commerce (TIC); 84 (2) Agricultural and Animal
81. See Ge Tan, Tax Treaties’ Interpretation and Application under the Challenges of the
Digital Economy – Issues Raised by PANAMSAT v. Beijing State Tax Bureau, 16 REVENUE LAW
JOURNAL 99 (2006).
82. U.S.–China Treaty, supra note 74, at art. 11.
83. Daniel H.K. Ho, Tax Law in Modern China: Evolution, Framework and Administration,
31 H.K. L.J. 141 (2011).
84. Also known as TIC.
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Husbandry Tax; (3) Deed Tax; and (4) Customs Duty. From these taxes,
TIC generates a major proportion of total tax revenue and is mainly
comprised of turnover and income taxes.
China is quickly becoming one of the largest economies in the
world, as well as one of the most popular investment destinations. This
was not always the case as, until 1979, China had no foreign direct
investment (FDI). 85 The 1979 economic reform in China created an
“open door” policy, which allowed foreign capital enterprises to invest
in China. Since the adoption of this policy, many foreign capital
enterprises have established some form of presence in China.
As a result of this reformation, China has witnessed incredible
economic growth in the last quarter of the twentieth century. According
to the State Statistical Bureau, in the twenty-year period of 1979 through
1999, “China utilized $459.6 billion of foreign capital and attracted
foreign direct investments of $305.9 billion.” 86 In addition, it was stated
that “China received the largest amount of FDI amongst all developing
countries between 1992 and 1998.” 87 At the same time, the Chinese
economy went through significant change and transformed from being
an isolated economy with limited interaction with global economics into
one of the world’s most influential and largest economies. 88 The
aforementioned transformation meant more than just economic growth.
It also meant that the Chinese government had to make significant
changes and implement strong and efficient international taxes and
international trade policies in a relatively short period as well as create,
legislate, and sign for the right tax laws and bilateral tax agreements. 89
The modern Chinese income tax system, which also deals with
85. Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications For
International Tax Debates, 8 U. FLA. TAX REV. 669 (2007).
86. See Daniel H.K. Ho, International Agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: A
Study of China, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 677 (2002); STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF 1991, 629 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1991); STATE STATISTICAL
BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF 1996, 527 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing
House, 1996); STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF 2000, 587
(Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 587).
87. IMF, Balance of Payments: Statistical Yearbook, 2 IMF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
STATISTICS NEWSLETTER 1, 64 (1999).
88. Nolan Cormac Sharkey, China’s Tax Integrity in Context of the Emerging International
Tax System, 45 THE CHINESE ECON., 56-75 (2012); Dwight H. Perkins, China’s Impact on the
World Economy (Summary of main points), http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/DP1021e.pdf; see also
Kenneth Rapoza, Just How Big is China’s Impact on the World Economy?, FORBES (April 14,
2016) https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/04/14/just-how-big-is-chinas-impact-on-theworld-economy/#479b5e7e7b9d; see also Javier Silva-Ruete, The Development of China’s Export
Performance, IMF (March 7, 2006) http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/030706.htm.
89. Id.
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foreign investments and international taxation questions, was created in
the early 1980s. To facilitate economic reforms and foreign investments,
China’s first two tax laws were created: the Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Venture Income (EJV) Tax Law 90 and the Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax (FEIT) Law. 91 The EJV Tax Law was applicable to “equity
joint ventures formed by a foreign investor and a Chinese partner.” Prior
to these tax laws, the most common form of a partner was typically a
state-owned enterprise. Alternatively, the FEIT Law affected various
other forms of FDI; this included “different types of joint venture
investments, joint explorations, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.”
The EJV Tax Law offered a more substantial tax incentive compared to
the FEIT Law because, during this time, China was still leery of foreign
corporations doing business in their country without having a “local
equity partner.” 92
From the 1980s through the 1990s in China, there was a substantial
amount of growth in special preferential tax regimes for FDI. 93 As its
economy began growing and the world continued to evolve, China
started to view itself as not only a major capital importer, but also a
major capital exporter. In the last ten years, the Chinese government has
initiated a new capital exporter policy. Under this new policy, there is an
increased focus on investing abroad in order to capitalize on raw
materials and have access to industrial assets, leading to a substantial
increase in outbound FDI. 94
Although China arrived late to the tax treaty arena, it quickly closed
90. Li, supra note 85, at n.1 (“The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China
Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (the “EJV Tax Law”), passed by
the National People’s Congress (NPC) on 10 September 1980. The implementing regulations for
this law were issues by the Ministry of Finance on 14 December 1980. Individual Income Tax Law
of the People’s Republic of China was also promulgated by the NPC in 1980.”).
91. Li, supra note 85 (“The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning
Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by the NPC on December 13, 1981 (the “FEIT Law”). Instead of
the flat rate of 30% of national tax as under the EJV Tax Law, the FEIT Law imposed tax at
progressive rates, ranging from 20% to 40%. A local tax was imposed at 10% of the national tax,
resulting in the top rate of 44% (as opposed to 33% for equity joint ventures).”)
92. Li, supra note 85, at 671.
93. Id. at 675; ALEX J. EASSON, TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION 156 (Kluwer, 1968). “Although, more than half of the total foreign direct
investment in China derives from Hong Kong, and approximately 80% of Hong Kong’s outward
investment goes to China . . . . It is a common practice that foreign investors invest in China via
their subsidiaries or branches in Hong Kong, partly because of the favorable tax environment in
Hong Kong. Another explanation is that there is a substantial amount of “round tripping,” i.e.,
domestic capital leaves China and re-invest from Hong Kong disguised as a foreign investment, in
order to enjoy the benefits of Hong Kong’s favorable tax incentives.” Id.
94. John Chan, China emerges as a major exporter of capital, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE
(May 19, 2009), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/05/chin-m19.html.
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the gap and has even overtaken other countries in its ability to shape
optimal tax treaty policy and later implement it into Chinese domestic
tax law. As of January 2012, China had ninety-seven income tax treaties
in effect and had draft agreements with additional countries at various
discussion stages, 95 creating a vast network of international treaties. 96
Since the globalization process and mobility factors have become
significant in today’s business landscape, the economies of China and
the U.S. are strongly linked to one another. These two economies work
closely together, but in some respects they are perfect opposites. For
example, China is a net capital exporter in traditional manufacturing and
a net capital importer in technology, services, and intellectual property, 97
while the United States is a net capital importer in traditional
manufacturing and a net capital exporter in technology, services, and
intellectual property. Due to this opposition, it is important to review and
analyze the evolution that China has experienced over the last few
decades and the resulting changes in its tax treaty policy.
B.

China’s Tax Treaties Evolution and Basic Guidelines

Although the modern income tax was not introduced in China until
1980, China was very quick to institute a negotiation program for tax
treaties. 98 China began to negotiate tax treaties with other countries in
1983. 99 After ten years, it had over thirty tax treaties signed; after twenty
years it had over eighty tax treaties signed; and as of May, 2015, China
had more than ninety tax treaties signed. 100 Compared to other
economies of this age, this output of treaties is an amazing feat,
especially without a published tax treaty model.
However, China used its first tax treaty agreement with Japan as a
model. 101 Two definite guidelines exist under this basic Chinese tax
treaty policy. 102 First, the policy employs a differential approach when

95. Tax Treaty, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (2015), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/2013/n2925/n2955/index.html.
96. China is actively seeking to sign new tax treaties. For example, as of May 2010, it had
signed ninety-one tax treaties. Hence, in about eighteen months, it signed six new tax treaties.
97. XIN ZHANG, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES IN CHINA
(Wildy, Simmons & Hill Publishing, 2003).
98. Alex Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in the People’s
Republic of China, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 677 (1986).
99. Japan was the first country China had a tax treaty with. See Tax Treaty, supra note 95.
100. Id.
101. Li Jinyan, China’s Tax Treaties and their Impact on Foreign Investment, 10 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1891 (1995).
102. CHINESE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION RESEARCH ASSOCIATION: THE COMPLETE WORKS
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negotiating with different countries. If negotiating with a developed
country, the Chinese government will be cautious about the
counterparty’s requirements for narrowing the taxation scope of the
source country; if negotiating with a developing country, it will fully
respect the counterparty’s concern about the source taxation and require
an equal treatment for both parties. Second, their process of negotiating
a tax treaty identifies and represents the needs and concerns of both
countries, understanding the importance of protecting the national fiscal
interest and the needs for attracting foreign capital, technologies, and
human sources. Although this second guideline seems very logical, this
concept is not very common around the world, as it demands countries
to put significant effort into understanding the ramifications of every tax
treaty negotiation before the discussion has even begun.
C.

China’s Tax Treaty Analysis

Although China adopted a relatively new approach for a capital
exporting country, China’s tax treaty policy stayed the same, unlike
other countries. Also, China’s tax treaties are based on three different
forms as opposed to one fixed form. For instance, if we examine Article
7, which deals with business profits in Chinese tax treaties, we find that
the first version is almost a replication of the OECD Model, the second
version is based on the U.N. Model, and the third version is an
independent version. This approach may seem contradictory, as it is
commonly said that the OECD Model favors developed economies,
while the U.N. Model favors developing economies. However, a closer
look will show that China is in a similar situation as the United States
because in some parts of the world they are a net capital exporter and in
others they are a net capital importer, and these models are geared
towards characteristics of being a capital exporter or a capital importer
country.
China will sometimes sign tax treaties under different models since
it is better for its economic interests as a net capital importer. From the
year 2000 until 2007, China entered into approximately an equal number
of treaties that were based on the OECD Model as treaties that were
based on the U.N. Model. 103 This analysis shows that, at that point,
China did not have one tax model that it aspired to implement in each of
its tax treaty negotiation processes, but conversely examined each
OF THE PRACTICE OF CHINA’S TAX TREATIES,

13-14 (The People’s Publication Press, 1997).
103. Tianlong Lawrence Hu, China Tax Treaty and Policy – Development and Updates
(August 11, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2642597.
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country and the economic relationship it had, or could have, with that
country. Although not conclusive, there is no doubt this analysis was
also influenced by the other party to the treaty, its different
characteristics, the negotiating ability of each side, and many other
factors that arise within meetings. China’s economic power has only
grown in the past few decades, so it is reasonable to assume that it has,
at a minimum, some ability to favorably influence its position within
treaty negotiations.
One of the major deviations between the OECD Model and patterns
observed within China’s tax treaties is Article 7.3, modeled after the
U.N. Model. While they use the OECD Model text of Article 7.3 as the
starting point, a few of these tax treaties contain parts of the U.N. Model
or make additional limitations on the deductions allowed. This departure
from the OECD Model is somewhat peculiar. If all factors were held
constant, one would expect the tax treaties of any given country to be
largely consistent regardless of the other party to the tax treaties. Yet,
Article 7.3 of China’s tax treaties varies from country to country.
Of the thirty-five tax treaties that China entered into with OECD
Member countries, 104 thirteen of them use the U.N. Model Article 7.3
and twenty-two of them use OECD Model Article 7.3. Most of the tax
treaties that used U.N. Model Article 7.3 were entered into in the 1980s,
whereas those with the OECD Model were entered into from the 1990s
and onwards. Generally, this signals that in China’s earlier tax treaties it
took the position of a developing country. This justified the use of U.N.
Model Article 7.3, and China likely took this approach to limit the
amount of deductions allowed to Permanent Establishments, thus
minimizing the profit and tax being extracted from the country.
However, as China moved into viewing itself as a more developed
country and adopting the new capital exporting approach, the OECD
Model Article 7.3 was accordingly used. Additionally, eleven of China’s
tax treaties use an Independent Article 7.3. See Appendix A for a much
more detailed analysis.
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of China’s tax treaties, a
further look into the tax treaties that China has signed with Japan, 105 the
United States, 106 and the United Kingdom 107 is necessary. The final tax
104. This number includes countries that were OECD Member countries at the time of the
treaty negotiations.
105. China–Japan Treaty, supra note 76. The treaty was concluded on September 6, 1983, and
became effective on January 1, 1985.
106. U.S.–China Treaty, supra note 74. The treaty was concluded on April 30, 1984, and
became effective on January 1, 1987.
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treaty this section will also focus on is the treaty between China and
Hong Kong. Although this is not an income tax treaty, it can still be
compared to the conventional tax treaty models (i.e., the OECD Model
and the U.N. Model), and more importantly it will allow us to
understand a lot more about Chinese international tax policy.
Each of the selected tax treaties is divided into traditional chapters
and contains twenty-eight to thirty articles. However, there is one very
clear exception to this: the China-Hong Kong tax treaty surprisingly
includes only seven articles due to the fact that a number of specific
provisions are embraced in the first three aforementioned treaties. 108 The
most notable omitted provisions include income from immovable
property, associated companies, or passive income such as dividends,
royalties, interest, and capital gains. 109 With regard to personal taxation
provisions, the China-Hong Kong treaty does not include pensions,
government services, teachers, researchers, students, apprentices, or
trainees. 110 Furthermore, the China-Hong Kong tax treaty omitted other
common provisions such as non-discrimination, mutual agreement
procedure, and exchange of information. 111
A review of the residency question will demonstrate China’s
approach to tax treaties and the negotiation process, which will then
translate to its tax policy. In most cases, under the Chinese residency
laws, it is not possible for a corporation to be a “dual citizen” due to the
strict definition of a Chinese Resident Enterprise. 112 However, if a
corporation does have dual residency, the place of residency is
determined under the China–U.K. Tax Treaty as the “place of effective
management.” 113 If a corporation’s management is in one nation and the
head office is in another, then the relevant authorities of both nations
107. The Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Reciprocal
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital Gains, P.R.C.–U.K., July 26, 1984, (1984) [hereinafter China–U.K. Treaty].
The treaty was concluded on July 26, 1984, and became effective on April 1, 1985 (for corporation
tax) and on April 6, 1985 (for income tax and capital gains tax) in the United Kingdom, and on
January 1, 1985, in China.
108. Daniel K. Ho, International Agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: A Study
of China, 32 H.K.L. J. 677, 682 (2002).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Coudert Brothers LLP, China Tax and Customs Law Guide, SINGAPORE: CCH ASIA
PTE LIMITED (2001) (“It is simply not likely that an enterprise that was formed under [mainland]
law, and is managed and controlled out of its head office in China, would also be considered to be a
resident in another country.”).
113. China–U.K. Treaty, supra note 107, at art. 4(3).
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will work to reach a mutual agreement to determine the place of
residency; 114 the same will be done under the China–Hong Kong Double
Taxation Agreement (DTA). On the other hand, in the China–Japan Tax
Treaty, residency is not determined by the place of effective
management, but instead where the “head or main office” is located.115
One of the main differences between the treaty signed with the United
States and the treaty signed with Japan is the inclusion of the “Limitation
of Benefits” provision. 116 The main purpose of this provision is to
attempt to reduce treaty shopping. 117 The Limitation of Benefits provides
that if a corporation is considered a U.S. resident under a treaty, if it can
also be the resident of a third country that also has a tax treaty with
China, then it will be considered a resident of only the said third
country. 118
Hence, as shown above, China accepted the counter party’s
demands on the residency issue. From its own perspective, China even
made a waiver allowing the other party to enforce its own domestic
rules, which eventually should have enabled it to collect more taxes.
However, in reality, China did not make significant waivers, if any at all,
as it already dealt with the dual residency question in its own domestic
law and made sure it would be unlikely to arise.
Another interesting way China’s tax treaty policy differs from
others is how it utilizes the OECD and U.N. Models to shape its own
domestic tax law. First, notions are presented in the tax treaties that
114. Id.
115. China–Japan Treaty, supra note 76, at art. 4(3).
116. U.S.–China Treaty, supra note 74. The “Limitation of Benefit” provision under the
China–U.S. Tax Treaty “requires that a corporation or partnership have a greater connection with
the parties to the treaty than simply being formed under a U.S. or a [mainland] statute. In order for
an entity to benefit from the treaty, more than 50% of the beneficial interests in such an entity must
be owned directly or indirectly by citizens or residents of the US or [China]. To benefit from the
lower withholding tax rates provided in the treaty, more than 50% of the income subject to
withholding must ultimately be beneficially owned by citizens of the U.S. or [China].” See
Elizabeth Chippindale & Jefferson Vander Wolk, Tax Treaties, in HOWARD GENSLER, CHINA TAX
AND ACCOUNTING MANUAL 316 (Hong Kong: Asia Law & Practice Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. 1998).
117. The term “treaty shopping” refers to cases in which a person (which is usually a
company) “shops around” or examines various tax treaties before they establish a holding company
in the jurisdiction that provides the most favorable tax treaty treatment. See Treaty Shopping &
INTERNATIONAL
TAX
BLOG
(May
18,
2008),
Anti-Treaty
Shopping,
http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/2008/05/treaty-shopping.html.
118. U.S.–China Treaty, supra note 74, at art. 4(4). An example is that a U.S. incorporated
company can be considered a tax resident of the United States under the China-U.S. Tax Treaty. If
the U.S. company has its head office in Japan, then according to the terms of the China-Japan Tax
Treaty, the company can be considered a tax resident of Japan. In such situations, the China-Japan
Tax Treaty prevails and the U.S. company is considered as a tax resident of Japan and not of the
United States for treaty purposes; see Coudert Brothers LLP, supra note 112.
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China signs, which are later integrated into domestic law. However,
there are certain issues which can result from this practice. For example,
in some instances, tax treaties have supplemented and clarified the
domestic law, seen with the definition of “royalty.” This causes too
much reliance on tax treaties and prevents domestic tax law from
evolving. 119
Tax treaties have had a significant influence over domestic law,
which has made it more important for Chinese policy makers to
understand, learn, and implement tax policies to the best of their abilities
within each tax treaty that China negotiates. All in all, China serves as
an example of a country that, in a relatively short period of time,
synthesized a modern tax system and a substantial tax treaty network to
serve the tax policy that aligns with its economic interests—meaning it
implemented taxes on foreign investment in order to preserve an amount
of the profit generated. 120
Applying the same analysis to the United States from a tax policy
perspective, and assuming the U.S. Model serves as a benchmark for
every U.S. tax treaty negotiation process, will conclude that this is
hardly an ideal situation for the United States because of the unique
position the United States has. Due to its unique position in the world, it
is realistic to assume that the United States has a high probability of
achieving a tax treaty as close as possible, if not identical, to its initial
proposition during tax treaty negotiations. In this case, it is even more
important that the United States configure and truly understand its
optimal treaty structure since it has a much higher ability to achieve it
than most other countries. If the United States were to adopt a more
flexible and efficient tax treaty model, one that reflects economic
transitions and the shift from a pure capital exporter to some type of a
hybrid economy, the result of treaty negotiations would reflect the U.S.’s
economic interests in a much more suitable way and eventually
maximize its tax revenue. This would be true whether the model was a
straightforward model or a more complex model that suggests different
approaches to the various articles. In order to understand how the U.S.
can create a more flexible structure in dealing with “developing
countries,” it is important to analyze how Latin American countries have
dealt with tax treaty issues.

119. THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX
TREATIES: CHINA 261 (Michael Lang et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2012).
120. Easson and Li, supra note 98, at 694.
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VII. LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY—WHAT CAN WE
LEARN FROM IT?
A.

Latin American Countries—General Introduction

As explained earlier, international organizations are reluctant to
define the term “developing country” or “developed country.” However,
in common practice, the OECD considers the following countries
“developed”: Japan, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
Western Europe, the Southern African Customs Union, and Israel. 121 All
countries not listed above are thus likely considered by the OECD, U.N.
and the WTO to be developing countries. 122
Another common way to define developing and developed
countries is by using the Human Development Index created by the U.N.
This analysis combines different measures including “life expectancy,
educational attainment, and income (gross domestic product 123 per
capita).” 124 According to this standard, a country is developed if it
provides its citizens with greater education, health care, income,
employment, et cetera. 125 Consistently, almost all countries deemed to be
developed, using this standard, are the same countries listed by the
OECD as such. This fact is hardly a surprise, since GDP explains “more
than 50% of the inter-country variation in life satisfaction,” and it is a
crucial factor in determining whether a particular country is developed
or not. 126
Generally, a country’s GDP has three main elements: consumption,

121. GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS, DEVELOPED, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OECD
(2006) http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6326.
122. See, WHO ARE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO?, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (2015), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm. The WTO
does, however, have a more specialized process to determine whether a country is developing
because developing countries could receive benefits when negotiating a free trade treaty (e.g. longer
exclusion periods for reduction of tariffs); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, Oct. 30, 1947, at art. XVIII.
123. Hereinafter, GDP.
124. JOHN HANCOCK, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICAL & SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT FUNDS 286 (Kogan Page Publishers, 2005); U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP],
DEFINING
AND
MEASURING
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
9-10
(May
1,
1990),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_ chap1.pdf.
125. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 124.
126. GDP is used to calculate the purchasing power parity per capita—one of the most
recognized and objective measures of living standards used by the International Monetary Fund,
The World Bank, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See Economist, The Economist Intelligence
Unit’s
Quality-of-Life
Index
(2005),
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/
QUALITY_OF_LIFE.PDF.
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investment, and government spending. 127 The interaction between these
elements is not completely clear; however, it is possible that a greater
investment rate generates a higher GDP. Therefore, to directly increase
GDP, a country should increase its foreign direct investment. 128
According to a report on FDI in Latin America issued by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 129 FDI
increased thirteen percent from 2007 to 2008. 130 At that time, the
average worldwide FDI decreased fifteen percent (related to the
financial crisis). 131 It is important to note that three countries—Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia—received nearly eighty percent of that region’s
total FDI, 132 because this shows us the vast difference between countries
in Latin America and their level of development. Generally, in order for
Latin American countries to become developed countries, they need to
increase their GDP, which is subsequently linked to increasing their FDI.
Such countries are, in essence, capital importers and typically, capital
importer countries will choose to use the U.N. Model. This is a grossly
oversimplified statement, but not necessarily untrue.
As with most developing countries, the majority of Latin American
countries have relatively simple economic needs and depend upon the
source-based taxes levied on foreign taxpayers. 133 In fact, many of these
taxes imposed are not usually subject to source-based taxation in
countries that are developed. This is to ensure maximum revenue
generation. On top of that, most of these countries use a territorial taxbased system. Therefore, they receive no benefit from resident income
earned outside of the respective country. Not only do they lose that
potential tax revenue, but when it comes to the flow of revenue, it is
mainly one-sided; foreign residents derive much more revenue from
Latin American countries than residents from those countries derive
from foreign sources. Therefore, for most Latin American countries, the
current U.N. Model seems, on its face, to apply to their positions.
127. OLIVIER BLANCHARD, MACROECONOMICS 44 (Pearson Prentice Hall, 5th ed. 2009)
(1997).
128. Hereinafter, FDI.
129. Hereinafter, ECLAC.
130. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. and the Caribbean [ECLAC], La Inversión Extranjera
Directa en América Latina y el Caribe [Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the
Caribbean] 7-149, ECLAC Doc.
LC/G.2406-P, Sales No. S.09.II.G.24 (2009) (Sp.),
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/36091/LCG2406ef.pdf.
131. Id.
132. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2008, UNITED
NATION 25 (United Nations Publications, 2009).
133. Matthew J. Kust, Tax Treaties with under Industrialized Countries, 13 TAX EXECUTIVE
175, 188-89 (1961).
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The U.N. Model grants more significance than the OECD Model to
taxation at the source rather than residency. Many countries in Latin
America have signed tax treaties with both developed and developing
countries and currently strive to sign more in the future. The main reason
for this policy is to encourage the exchange of information and to
promote FDI, which, as a result, promotes growth. 134 The U.N. Model is
by far the model used most frequently when negotiating tax treaties in
Latin America. 135 However, experience and experimentation have yet to
prove the actual success of the U.N. Model in promoting growth. 136
Most developed countries are not eager to give up “tax authority for
relevant businesses.” 137 This raises the question: do Latin American
countries achieve their goal by signing tax treaties?
Assuming the goal is to create growth, the answer to that question
is unfortunately not straightforward. Some studies show that the effect of
tax treaties on FDI is minimal—less than ten percent. 138 Other studies,
from sometimes even the same sources, show that tax treaties either have
a neutral or a negative effect on FDI. Thus, it is impossible to determine
whether one tax treaty model or another can even assist a country to
achieve its goal and implement its tax policy efficiently. Moreover, it is
crucial to understand that it is uncertain whether tax treaties actually
foster a better international tax system compared to unilateral
measures. 139
There are several countries in Latin America such as Bolivia, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Panama, where foreign
source income is not taxed at all, 140 that would not benefit from the
134. Nora Balzarotti, Los Acuerdos de Doble Tributación y la Inversión Extranjera Directa:
¿Cómo se Relacionan? [Double Tax Convention and Foreign Direct Investment: How Do They
Interact?], 52 AMCHAM Technical Studies Series Document No.1 (2010); Hugo A. Hurtado, Is
Latin American Taxation Policy Appropriate for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment in the
Region?, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 313, 344 (2011).
135. This is of course, in theory only, since many countries in this region strive to sign tax
treaties believing that this is a necessary thing to attract investment into their country, and as a result
end up signing a tax treaty that is based on the OECD Model. For example, Chile signed a tax treaty
with the U.S. that is much closer to the OECD Model than the U.N. Model because it believed it
was a necessary step to promote economic growth in Chile due to the significant role the U.S.
investment played in the Chilean Economy. See, Hugo A. Hurtado, The U.S. and Chile Tax Treaty
and Its Impact on Foreign Direct Investment, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 41 (2012).
136. Id. at 139.
137. Id.
138. Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on US FDI
Activity 1-37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7929, 2000),
http://www.nber.org/papers/W7929.pdf.
139. Hurtado, supra note 135 at 141.
140. John Prebble & David I. White, Source and Residence: New Configuration of their
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implementation of the U.N. Model in terms of revenue because it may
take a long time before these countries become net capital exporters and
can actually use the benefit offered by the U.N. Model. 141
Going back to two of the most basic assumptions in international
tax, capital importing countries would aspire to maximize (1) the tax
base and (2) the applicable tax rate. The result of these assumptions, as
mentioned earlier, is that Latin American countries would prefer the
U.N. Model for tax treaties. However, Colombia refrained from
negotiating tax treaties until 2004 “under the philosophy of protecting
the tax base,” when its government adopted an approach described by
others as “attracting investment at any price.” 142 When they began
engaging in tax treaty negotiations, they went on to use the OECD
Model. As a direct result, Colombia lost a significant amount of revenue
because of the misconstrued belief that simply signing tax treaties with
other countries would be beneficial for Colombia’s economic interests.
This brings up another important factor in the tax treaty negotiation
process: the outcome of such negotiations is quite likely to reflect the
power balance between the two countries. The side that is better
prepared and aware of all the possible policy issues affecting the
negotiating parties will be able to gain a more beneficial result than the
less prepared country.
Again, the most important issue concerning contemporary tax treaty
models is whether a country can be classified as a capital exporter or
importer, which requires a definition of the capital referenced. The
models today are one-dimensional and unfortunately cannot provide an
answer to the complex and sophisticated economies and tax systems that
are adopted in many of today’s countries. 143 Therefore, when the
adoption of a tax treaty model becomes necessary for a country, it must
conduct a much more extensive and in-depth study of the goals it strives
to achieve with each treaty partner before any further communication.
Although researching the other side of the treaty is important, the results
are sometime unpredictable. In some cases, a country that the OECD
considers to be a developing country may prefer to use the OECD Model
over the U.N. Model and vice versa. Also, it may be the case that a

Principles, 90 CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT’L 491 (2005).
141. Hurtado, supra note 135 at 141.
142. Martin Hearson, Tax Treaty Negotiation: What Affects the Outcome For Developing
Countries, Part 1, Martin Hearson: Tax, Development and International Relations (November 8,
2012),
https://martinhearson.wordpress.com/2012/11/08/tax-treaty-negotiation-what-affects-theoutcome-for-developing-countries//.
143. In many ways, tax treaties are like dinosaurs in the modern world of international trade.
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country, whether it is a developed or developing country, does not care
which model it uses, as the goals behind signing the specific tax treaty
are not always economic, but rather political.
B.

The Federative Republic of Brazil
1. Country Profile

Commonly referred to as simply Brazil, the Federative Republic of
Brazil is the largest country in South America. It is also the fifth largest
country in the world, both by geographical area and by population with
over 192 million people. Brazil has one of the world’s fastest growing
economies, and is the largest national economy in Latin America.
According to the World Bank, it is the seventh largest economy in the
world, both by nominal GDP and purchasing power parity (as of the year
2014). 144
Between the years 1993 and 2017, 10,889 mergers and acquisitions
transactions were announced with a total worth of $1,143 trillion
including the contribution of Brazilian firms. 145
Brazil’s economy has gone through substantial changes over the
past fifty years. In 1967, Brazil imposed almost sixty federal taxes,
employed a territorial tax system, and did not impose corporate level
taxation at all. 146 Such a tax system provided strong incentives to export,
but at the same time, the lack of corporate taxation also inadvertently
created an incentive for foreign investors to accumulate tax-deferred
wealth in Brazilian corporate entities. This system is the exact opposite
of a system that is created to establish capital export neutrality, like the
United States, for example. 147 In contrast to the U.S. system, Brazil
currently imposes only a few federal taxes, exercises a worldwide
taxation jurisdiction, and taxes corporate income. 148 This alone

144. GDP Ranking, Data, THE WORLD BANK (2014), http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf and http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
145. Statistics on Mergers & Acquisitions, Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances,
INSTITUTE FOR MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & ALLIANCES, https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-astatistics-countries/#Mergers-Acquisitions-Brunei-Darussalam.
146. Kathleen Matthews, U.S. IFA Branch Explores Capital Flows to and from Argentina, 7
TAX NOTES INT’L 1611, 1611 (1993); Albertina Fernandez, Title of work, 14 TAX NOTES INT’L 21,
22 (1997).
147. For a discussion of capital export neutrality, see generally, LABRENDA GARRETTNELSON, The Future of Deferral, TAXING AMERICA 233-237 (Karen B. Brown and Mary
Louise Fellows eds., 1996). The United States partially counterbalancing that incentive through the
1962 Foreign Controlled Corporations laws; see generally, I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1997).
148. Matthews, supra note 146; U.S. IFA Branch Explores Capital Flows to and from
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exemplifies the complete transformation, through extensive tax reform,
that the Brazilian economy underwent. Brazil’s tax policy must have
changed as a result of the economic restructuring. It also shows that
Brazil made a decision to adopt a tax policy that is more closely related
to those of other developed countries. Therefore, Brazil’s tax treaty
network, signed prior to that reform, is no longer appropriate for Brazil’s
current economic goal and tax policy.
2. Brazil—Tax Treaty Policy
Although not considered by most definitions a developed country,
in its tax treaty agreements, Brazil generally follows the OECD Model
and its two methods to eliminate double taxation: (1) the tax credit
method; and (2) the tax exemption method. However, some of the rules
adopted in these tax treaties are similar to the provisions in the U.N.
Model, which, in most cases, were drafted to be more beneficial to
developing countries.
In 1967, in accordance with the postwar trend, Brazil signed its first
tax treaty. Since that time, it has signed tax treaties with almost thirty
countries. 149 The traditional doctrine regarding the relation between tax
treaties and domestic law is in favor of the primacy of international law
and is generally adopted by Brazilian writers. Notwithstanding this,
treaties possess a hierarchical status equal to that of ordinary federal
laws in Brazilian practice. Thus, conflict situations are settled by
applying the Lex Posterior Derogat Priori principle. If the treaty is more
recent than a conflicting domestic law, this law is overruled by the
treaty.
Even though the United States is one of the most important world
trade partners to Brazil, the two countries still do not have an active tax
treaty, 150 mostly due to the “tax sparing” issue that was never
resolved. 151 As explained earlier, tax treaty provisions are often used
merely as a tool to give legitimacy to, or perhaps rationale for, other
non-economic reasons for failure to enter into a tax treaty. After fifty
Argentina, 7 TAX NOTES INT’L 1611, 1611 (1993); Albertina M. Fernandez, Business, Tax
Authorities Work Toward Consensus on Electronic Commerce, 15 TAX NOTES INT’L 21, 22 (1997).
149. Brazil Tax Treaties, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/
Brazil-Individual-Foreign-tax-relief-and-tax-treaties (stating that Brazil holds tax treaties with the
following countries: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spin, Sweden,
Ukraine.)
150. Yariv, supra note 56.
151. David R. Tillinghast, U.S. Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 476 (1996).
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years of political promotion between the U.S. and Brazil, an agreement
has yet to be produced. At the same time, Japan152 and many EU
countries have signed tax treaties with Brazil. 153 Therefore, the fact that
Brazil has not entered a tax treaty with the biggest economic power in
the world must be related, in one way or another, to more than just
economic or tax reasons. 154
VIII. TAX TREATY MODELS—A SUGGESTED FUTURE
A.

The “Old” Tax Treaty Policy Way of Thinking

As previously explained, the “old” mode of thinking when it comes
to tax treaty policy is fairly straightforward and simple. The first step
requires each country to identify itself as a developed country or a
developing country. This step relies on the assumption that if a country
considers itself to be a developed country, the right model for its
economic use and interests is the OECD Model, while the U.N. Model
serves the needs of a developing country. However, as previously
explained, the definition of a developing or developed country is far
from all-encompassing and can be easily manipulated for each country’s
needs. Second, each model is too simple and single minded, meaning
they were developed, written, and based upon a reality that is no longer
relevant in many circumstances. Most likely, using these models “as-is”
will not be ideal for most economies and countries. These irrelevancies
could cause detrimental effects for countries that do not modify the
original language of these models. As a result, when following the old
pattern, almost all countries use either the OECD Model or the U.N.
Model, or one modeled after these two. Perhaps the only country that
does not follow this pattern is China, who instead tries to evaluate its
economy’s current needs compared to the needs of each tax treaty
partner prior to the negotiation process, which is expounded upon in the
prior section.
B.

The “New” Tax Treaty Policy Way of Thinking

Coupling the inherent difficulty in updating a tax treaty, due to the
need to address every development, with the fact that tax treaties are
never negotiated from scratch, a tax policy that fully comprehends and
152. Juliana Mello, Brazil and International Tax Treaties, THE BRAZIL BUSINESS, Sept. 10,
2012, http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/brazil-and-international-tax-treaties.
153. Id.
154. See Yariv, supra note 56; S. Exec. Rep. No. 90-5 (1968).
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embraces the guidelines necessary to accomplish a country’s world trade
goals is necessary. The tax policy also needs to be practicable, or in
other words, realistically achievable.
This paper suggests a different approach to tax treaties, beginning
long before the parties communicate. Each tax treaty must be negotiated
separately in order to address the primary needs that are present in the
two parties’ economic relationship. First, each country should pinpoint
the specific reasons for entering a tax treaty with the suggested partners.
It should be noted that the suggested approach is that each country
perform an in-depth study based on the parties involved, and not simply
a general tax policy study. However, this paper does not suggest that
such a general study is useless or holds no merit. Rather, such a general
study should be used as a benchmark for a much more specific, ad-hoc,
and up-to-date study prior to each tax treaty negotiation process. By
utilizing this suggested process, the chance that the treaty negotiation
team will have all the necessary information and tools to sign the
optimal tax treaty would be enhanced each negotiation. The specific
purpose for the treaty should be written in the document itself instead of
simply opening with the recitation that “tax treaties are entered into
between countries for the purposes of avoiding double taxation of
international income flows and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income and capital gains.” 155 By adding the specific
purpose to the opening statement, the negotiation team does not simply
put words onto paper, but it can actually fabricate the specific tax treaty
framework and significantly improve future interpretations.
Once the interested party’s specific goals are identified, the second
step is to design the optimal tax treaty to achieve those goals. One
country that can effectively complete this step is China, since it is not
confined by one specific tax treaty model, i.e., the OECD Model or the
U.N Model, but has the freedom to adopt any aspect it wishes. This is
based on the understanding that, although China generally has a
customary international tax policy approach, it can still change, modify,
and tweak any detail, case by case, depending on the other country with
which it is negotiating. It is important to understand that this step may
evolve from country to country, mainly because of each country’s
economic characteristics and interests. The more sophisticated and
developed a country’s economy, the more intricate this stage will be

155. Committee of Experts on International Tax Matters, Seventh Session, Basic Approaches
to Tax Treaty Negotiation, UNITED NATIONS (2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/
seventhsession/CRP11_Add3_BasicApproaches.pdf.
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when trying to conduct the specific study for each potential treaty
partner. Countries should not be afraid to step away from the standard
treaty models and create a new treaty that incorporates unique details
and specific issues that are most relevant to the countries negotiating the
treaty. A country should acknowledge that it is not necessarily in its best
interests to adopt one treaty model in hopes it will cater to its diverse set
of needs, as it could potentially hinder future economic growth.
Once the first step is completed and finalized, the tax treaty
negotiation team should have two things in its hands. First is the general
tax policy study that describes the country’s general tax policy and
provides general guidelines, a high-level tax policy summary, and a
macro perspective for their economic goals, aspirations, and policy.
Second, they should have an up-to-date, specific, and detailed study that
presents a comprehensive analysis of their country’s economic
relationship with the potential tax treaty partner as well as an analysis of
their partner’s economy, tax policy, and goals.
The specific study should address various factors related to the
economic relationship between the two countries. For instance, the study
should include a detailed analysis of the trading relationship between the
two countries addressing the specific type of goods traded and the
industries who cooperate and do business within the two countries, a
comprehensive list of common interests, including incentives for the
other country to enter into a tax treaty agreement with the first country,
and a separate chapter discussing the other country’s tax treaty network
and specific characteristics in their tax treaty network.
Once the negotiating team has these two documents in its
possession, it can draft an ideal tax treaty model for the negotiation
process which will be used as a benchmark for its efforts. The created
model does not have to be one of two—the OECD Model or the U.N.
Model. In the case of very complicated economies such as the U.S.
economy, the model can exhibit hybrid qualities by adopting different
articles from the existing models and in some cases, even by including
articles constructed by the team to fully represent their country’s
interests. This step would not be possible if the team was not able to
obtain the information given to them in the prior step.
To better exemplify the necessity of this process, one should think
about the United States’ situation. Generally, the U.S. economy is
neutral with respect to its capital export and import levels. However, in
some relationships, such as those with countries in Asia, the U.S.’s main
import is traditional goods, while it concurrently exports a majority of its
intellectual property to these countries. These unique tax treaty situations
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cause a significant amount of capital to be lost, mostly due to a failure to
address these limitations and exceptions within the U.S.’s model.
In order to preserve the international tax framework that was built
over the past fifty years, a number of certain procedures must be kept
and respected. First, the general style and terminology of tax treaties
must continue. For the most part, all contemporary tax treaties follow the
same order of articles, terminology, and general language, whether
employing the U.N., the OECD, or the U.S. Model as a benchmark for
negotiations. This format should continue to be followed even if the
suggested approach is adopted. It is extremely important that, no matter
which model is used, or what changes are made during the negotiation
process, the end result allow any person who reads the tax treaty to be
familiar with the general structure, order, and language between the
different articles. Any change within a model must be drafted according
to the concepts mentioned above, thus allowing the model to be as
effective and efficient as possible.
Second, the assertion that changes should be made within the
models does not necessarily mean that these changes should be
incorporated into all aspects of a country’s policy. In this case, even
significant alterations can affect a small number of articles while still
utilizing the original language of the models. A quality-driven second
study will make necessary changes more obvious and make clear which
articles can be signed without any changes at all. As a result, the
efficiency of the tax treaty doubles, both within the negotiation process
and in the final treaty application.
An example of a specific, as well as significant, change is shown by
the United States’ situation: it is both a capital exporter and importer,
most traditional manufacturing is done outside the United States and is
imported into it, and a large amount of Intellectual Property is developed
and exported to other countries. Under current tax treaties, no specific
reference to this situation exists, mostly because few countries find
themselves in it, for the model was developed before any country was in
this situation. Hence, before even meeting for the first round of
negotiations, the United States’ primary goal should be to study this
issue of designation and fully understand how it wishes to tackle it. Only
then should the U.S. begin any treaty negotiations.
Depending on a number of factors—such as political pressure and
needs, the economic needs of each country, and the level of
comprehension and cooperation—the final goal in this process is to
reduce the time required when negotiating a treaty. For instance, the
U.S.–Slovenia tax treaty was signed after only seven months of
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negotiations. 156 However, in complete contrast to that negotiation
process, the United States and Brazil have been engaged in tax treaty
negotiations since 1947, and it appears the parties are no closer to
finalizing such a treaty than they were twenty years ago. Such a long,
extenuating progression can never be successful, simply because it will
not be able to meet a country’s economic needs within a timely manner,
no matter what those needs are. In addition to establishing an optimal
result, the treaty negotiations process should start with an end game and
be carefully administered to be as efficient as possible.

156. See Press Release, Slovenia, United States to Begin Income Tax Treaty Negotiations,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (Oct. 23, 1998), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/rr2771.aspx (announcing the November 30, 1998 commencement
of negotiations); Press Release, U.S.-Slovenia Sign Income Tax Treaty, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (June 21, 1999), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/rr3213.aspx (announcing the June 21, 1999 signing.)
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APPENDIX A
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